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Summary:
~egul~tion includes the many ways
tn which governments interfere with
the activities of economic actors via
rule making and lega l enforcement.
This regulation may be insightfully
classified into three broad types of
response to perceived market
failure : protection of competitive
results. protection from competitive
results, and regulation of externalities.
These types of regu lation. and the
legislation that accompanies them,
resu l t in both costs and benefits
which are substantially inseparable. since some costs inhere in each
type. The current perception of the
aggregate costs of regulation as intolerably high provides an opportunity for reform that will improve
the cost benefit balance, if zealous
but simplistic deregulation is
avoided .
Dissatisfaction with the current
regulator climate focuses on the increase in red tape. on ever-widening
litigation, on the stultification that
results from diverting new capital
funds from innovation into compliance, on the tendency rules have
to outlive their purposes, and on the
diversion of efforts of the regulated
from productive ventures to
avoidance and evasion. Why is
regulation now thus newly perceived as excessive. although many
of the needs to which it was a
response remain cogent?
Although inflation has little to do
with regu lation. our inability to
understand and cope with it has
prompted much of the current force
for deregu lation. The recognition
that governments as well as markets

can fail. an impact of Vietnam and
Watergat . is anot h er caus of dissatisfaction wi th regulation . A more
s_u btle cause i our growing recognition that "many of the most visible
and annoying costs of regulation are
in vitob l byproducts of the r gulation," as a urv
of the history of
regulation makes cl ar .
Regulation grew up in thr e
parate epochs . In the late nineenth centur. it was design d to
pr v nt or control monopoly, both
natural and unnatural. "Prescriptive
regulation of railroad, gas. electric
and wat r rates by independent
commissioners was designed to yield
the result that wou ld b produced
b
competitive markets," while
"proscriptive regu lation of monopoly. conspiracy, and predatory
b havior" protected the competitive
market itself.
The second wave of regulation. a
response to the Great Depression.
"was concerned with the fai lure of
comp titian. not with its absence."
During the 1960s and 1970s. the third
and most extensive period of
regulatory expansion. the concern of
regulators was predominantly with
market or societal failure due to
"adverse externa lities," or impingement on social goals by actors who
need not pay the cost. Although present malaise results in part from the
cumu lative effect of the three phases
of regulation. it is "the third that has
proven most decisive politically."
Study of even nineteenth century
regulation, which was "rule making
about Iimited aspects of activities
that affected a limited number of
well-identified firms and industries"
revea ls_the tendency of regulation to
generate adverse side effects and
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to expand into ever-increasing complexity. There are five sources of the
gradual growth of the regulatory ambit in the natural monopoly area:
adaptive behavior by the regulated
which requires further rules to prevent avoidance of the underlying
purpose of the first rule; iterative
rule making with imperfect reversibility; changes in economic conditions which have not been anticipated by the regulators; the
inevitable arbitrariness of requirements that companies allocate all
costs to either regulated or unregulated activities; and the need to
permit a regulated utility to respond
to emerging unregulated competition. All these are examples of
imperfect anticipation, an inevitable fact of an ever-changing world.
The most lasting legacy of the protectionist regulation of the 1930s is
the expectation that government will
provide insulation from the rigors of
the world. The idea of regulation to
provide redress has been extended
from firms and industries to apply to
"individuals claiming redress from
economic handicaps that had
previously been accepted as facts of
life." Physical disabililities, the competing demands of child bearing and
employment, or the lower level of
education and skill acquisition of
some members of minority groups
may be wholly worthy objects of
regulatory interference with market
determination; the point is that they
were a new form of regulatory involvement.
The elevation of such protectionism to a prominent role in
regulation has had major additional
consequences for the present regulatory environment, three of which are
continuous increase in the scope of
regulation, loss of resistance by the
regulated as a check on expanding
regulation, the bureaucratization of
regulation resulting from the increased importance of equitable
treatment and procedural due
process in a situation where
valuable entitlements are allocated
to some but not all.

The final two sections of Professor
Steiner's paper are excerpted here.
After discussing the particular
character and effects of the third
period of expanding economic
regulation, Steiner concludes by describing the types of analysis and
diagnosis that should accompany the
current zeal for reform.

Excerpt:
The third and most recent epoch of regulatory expansion
rests both on the recognition of adverse externalities
such as discrimination, pollution, and threats to personal
safety and on the sense of affluence that makes avoiding
of these social evils affordable. The double condition is
vitally important. It is not true that externalities are more
common now than they were fifty or one hundred years
ago .... The threshold of egregious harm was formerly
quite high, and acceptance of "normal" hazards, a part
of the ethic. A retired Pittsburgh steelworker recently
put the point elegantly: "I remember that when I was
young, we never thought about pollution. Everybody was
working, and everybody had money, and the smokestacks were smoking, and the air was dirty, and we were
all happy. I think the best air we ever had in Pittsburgh
was during the Depression. That's when nobody was
working."
The amenities of life and a greater degree of protection of individuals from avoidable injury are "goods"
that have (in the economists' phrase) high income
elasticity. As the society gets richer, we want to consume
such goods in disproportionately rising quantities. By the
1960s we felt we could afford not only guns and butter,
but cleaner air and more safety, too. Not merely
egregious hazards but any threats to safety and all pollution became subject to scrutiny. Since externality control
is inherently a function that must be provided by nonmarket action, it has led to expanded regulation. New
regulatory agencies were spawned and additional
requirements emanated from existing agencies.
The effect of this on the actual scope of regulation and
its perceived success has proven enormous. Some activities of all actors came under scrutiny, and the newly
scrutinized dimensions are largely additional to previous
ones. The first significant difference between externality
generated market failure and the earlier forms of regulation is that such externalities are truly pervasive, both in
time and in scope. As a result, efforts to prevent, mitigate, or control them became potentially limitless ....
The implication of moving from preventing specific
harms (e.g., collapsing mine tunnels) to achieving absolute goals (e.g., eliminating industrial accidents) is
formidable. There is no such thing as perfect safety or
nonpolluting activities. Thus, regulation is sure to "fail"
to achieve them. These are, of course, matters of degree,
and one of the problems of the new regulation is to
define the threshold level that triggers regulation. The
rhetoric of the externality-reformers neglects the threshold question. Freedom· from pollution and safety
become attributes, not variables. Once the notion of a
threshold is abandoned, the regulatory apparatus required becomes potentially vast, and the probability of
perceived failure very high.
Moreover, this very vastness leads to an expansion of
regulatory impact. Because public regulatory budgets
are constrained, a substitute must be found for the potentially unlimited public enforcement expenditures that
would be required. The solution is to shift the requirements for achieving the objectives to the regulated. This
substitutes policing for direct public control. In order to
make policing a manageable public activity, the natural
sequel is to impose extensive compliance-reporting requirements on all. This conserves public budgets, but
greatly expands private expenditures .... [T]he shift of
many of the costs of policy and compliance onto the
private sector and indeed on to individuals as well as
fir_ms ha_s had the important effect of making regulation a
fairly direct annoyance to a very large number of individuals who had previously regarded public regulation as something remote ....
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I have here stressed the effect of the new wave of externality regulation on the costs of intervention and,
more parti~ularly, on the perception by a large part of
the populat10n of these as costs. It would be a mistake to
neglect the benefits-the needs that led to a demand for
regulation. Thalidomide, Love Canal, Three-Mile Island,
and ~os Angeles smog are genuine horrors not public
relations constructs. Yet the needs for regulation have
been long perceived; it is the costs and failures that are
newly felt, because the beneficiaries are paying the costs
directly rather than indirectly.

*

*

*

The historical growth of regulation was a response to
the perception of new and more pervasive forms of
market failure. The more recent mood favoring
deregulation is a widening response to the perception of
regulatory failure. This statement is less portentous than
it may sound, for "failure" is a term of art. It need mean
no more than that anticipated benefits have been
achieved at higher than anticipated costs or that some of
the anticipated benefits have not been realized. In good
part what we today regard as failure in the regulatory
sphere is the product of early overoptimism,· even
naivete, about the ability of government to solve problems without burdening individuals, and underestimation of the innovative (but not necessarily socially optimal) responses of economic actors to attempts to constrain their private profit-maximizing behavior.
If then, in 1980, we were less naive than in 1908 or 1935
and there is a political climate receptive to rethinking
regulation, what is the proper consequence for our
behavior? Is it, as some now urge, that we go back to
what I will call the status of "unregulation"? The answer
is no, for the complex world in which we live is one in
which markets often work imperfectly (i.e., fail) and so
does remedial intervention. In such a world we seek not
maximum regulation or no regulation, but instead the appropriate mix of regulation and laissez faire. For the mix
selected there is the possibility of having erred in either
direction.
Let me state the problem formally, in economic terms.
I will consider some activity, say the construction of a
power plant to service Pittsburgh. One can imagine, at
one extreme, a regime of laissez faire-of letting the
private sector do what it pleases. Next, one can imagine a
variety of rules restricting the form of the plant (nuclear,
coal, oil, gas), or its location, or its size. At the other extreme, one can imagine a rule prohibiting construction at
all. Which of these many "rule sets" is best? The formal
answer is: the set that maximizes the difference between
"benefits," appropriately defined, and "costs" likewise
defined. This apparently trivial (and empty) statement
has some virtues: (1) It emphasizes that we are not seeking to find a costless rule, even if there is one, nor to
minimize the costs, nor to maximize the benefits.
Instead, we seek the best balance between benefits and
costs. (2) It invites the distinction between a suboptimal
rule and a perverse rule. A suboptimal rule may be
defined as one where benefits exceed costs, but not by as
much as possible; a perverse rule is one where costs exceed benefits. A suboptimal rule is better than nothing, a
perverse rule is not. (3) It emphasizes that suboptimality
is itself a variable concept, not an attribute: there may be
better or worse imperfect rules. (4) It suggests that
benefits and costs are concepts that must be defined and
measured before we can have any consensus about
whether a rule is perverse, suboptimal, or optimal. ...
Analysts are today comparing, at long last, imperfect
regulation (which we now know to be imperfect) with
imperfect markets. Regulation, and the market failure it
is designed to correct, is not a unitary phenomenon.
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Neither is the adequacy or inadequacy of particular
regulatory regimes or of the legislation that creates them.
The choice among solutions-more regulation, less
regulation, different regulation, and unregulation-may
each be appropriate some of the time. There is need for
serious analysis and diagnosis. We need to reconsider
the alternatives, regulatory regime by regulatory regime,
market failure by market failure, regulatory failure by
regulatory failure, and see if we cannot come closer to a
better mix of the free market and regulation.
Here lies the promise in the present zeal for reconsidering each regulation. The disenchantment with
governmental infallibility, albeit belated, can be a major
constructive force in the economy and in the society. It
may help to increase the growth potential, to decrease inflationary forces, and even to decrease the unnecessary
legalization of American society.
However, there is also reason for concern. For much of
the zeal is that of a simplistic ideology, rather than of
analysis of trade-offs .... The modern regulatory
reformers see government failure and neglect the
market failure that originally caused government to get
involved. They regard most regulation as perverse rather
than merely suboptimal. Some reformers are willingeven eager-to sacrifice the benefits along with the costs.
The public goes along because it sees the costs, but
neglects the link of those costs to the unmistakable
benefits of the regulations we have installed over a century. The most zealous of the reformers are not naivetheir ac:tions reflect placing a much lower value than
most of the public on the underlying needs which
motivated regulation in the first place, and typically remain. They are, in truth, the radical right. They have
capitalized on the popular disenchantment and on a confusion between the need for changes in the extent and
form of regulation and the desirability of some regulation. The political day of reckoning in deregulation, as
well as in budget cutting, will come when the uncommitted public see what they have given up.
I have neglected "legalization" since the opening paragraphs of this paper; it is time to relate the level and
nature of regulation to the question of legalization. The
latter term includes first the increased use of legal and
administrative processes and second the increased
bureaucratization of society. The higher the level of
regulatory activity, other things being equal, the greater
the legalization in both senses. However, for a given
level of regulatory activity, different forms of legalization may be more or less bureaucratizing....
Is legalization a "good" or a "bad"? There is no doubt
that so far as it represents unnecessary interference with
freedom of individual action or unproductive bureaucratization it is undesirable. But much of the legalization (in both senses) of modern economic regulation
arises from the need to observe substantive and/or procedural due process in areas where regulation meets
real needs. Optimal regulation would lead to an optimal
degree of legalization; suboptimal regulation may well
lead to excessive legalization.
A most dangerous symptom of the deregulatory fervor
of the moment is the "anti-legalistic" bias it reveals. It is
not too much legalization but any legalization that is
scorned. There seems almost no appreciation that while
due process may be costly-sometimes unnecessarily
costly-it is ultimately a necessary condition of outcomes
that can command public confidence. Legalization is sadly not sufficient, but it is surely necessary.

